Building the joint probability distribution (JPD) of wind power and its forecast for correlated wind farms (WFs) is critical because one can derive the conditional probability distribution of wind power or its forecast error at a given forecast value from the JPD and then generate scenarios or calculate quantiles from it for the stochastic analysis of power systems. The traditional centralized approach for modeling the JPD faces problems such as expensive high bandwidth, limited scalability and lack of robustness to communication failures. A distributed modeling algorithm is an alternative but will reveal the privacy of WFs due to the exchange of raw data information between neighbors. Based on the Gaussian mixture model (GMM), this paper proposes a privacy-preserving distributed expectationmaximization algorithm to build the JPD based on additive homomorphic encryption, binary hash function and the average consensus algorithm. The correctness and the robustness to communication failures of the proposed algorithm are empirically verified using historical data.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IND power (WP) is clearly outlining the future sustainable energy systems. As a common idea to address the uncertainty of WP, the chance-constrained optimal schedule with wind farms (WFs) has been investigated by many researchers, e.g., chance-constrained unit commitment [3] - [5] , chance-constrained economic dispatch [7] , or chanceconstrained ramping reserve schedule [8] . In those studies, the probability distribution of WP is established first and serves as the foundation for sampling techniques or quantile calculation techniques to deal with the chance constraints.
When establishing a probability distribution, two issues must be clearly considered: (1) which uncertain factors to set as random variables and (2) which probability distribution model to use. For the first issue, the above studies set WP and WP forecast (WPF) as variables so that once a new forecast value is generated, it can be substituted into the probability distribution to obtain a conditional probability distribution of WP or its forecast error at the given forecast value [3] - [5] , [7] , [8] . For the second issue, the researchers in [3] - [5] assume that the uncertainty of WP follows a Gaussian distribution. However, the Gaussian assumption may result in inaccuracy since WP is a non-Gaussian random variable [7] . Other distribution model assumptions are also made, e.g., Weibull distribution [5] , Cauchy distribution [10] and versatile distribution [12] . Although the Cauchy distribution fits better than the Weibull distribution in some certain timescales [10] , this distribution, as well as the versatile distribution, are 'unimodal', which cannot capture the 'multi-peaks' characteristic of WP [13] . The Gaussian mixture model (GMM), which can characterize random variables subject to an arbitrary distribution and arbitrary dimensions with remarkable performance, has been gradually applied for characterizing the uncertainty in WP [7] , [8] . In this paper, we also take multiple WP and WPF of correlated WFs as random variables, and we choose the GMM to build their joint probability distribution (JPD).
The expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm is the most commonly used algorithm for training GMM [14] - [17] . The traditional approach is to collect all historical WP and WPF data and send them to a third-party data center to train the GMM-based JPD, known as the centralized EM algorithm. However, the centralized EM algorithm requires expensive high bandwidth communication between the data center and every WF [18] . Meanwhile, due to its limited scalability [19] , variations of the network topology will highlight the inflexibility of centralized algorithms. Furthermore, the failure of any communication line will result in the disconnection of a WF and all its data. To overcome the above problems, a distributed EM algorithm is a feasible alternative [24] - [27] . However, those distributed EM algorithms require the exchange of data between WFs. To protect data privacy, WFs with different stakeholders may be reluctant to share raw data with each other. Therefore, this paper aims to develop a privacy-preserving distributed (PPD) EM algorithm to train the GMM-based JPD for correlated WFs.
In the data-mining field, many efforts have focused on the PPD EM algorithm [20] - [23] . In [20] , [21] , a PPD EM algorithm is proposed based on the secure sum technique, which can accurately calculate the sum of data without revealing the data privacy of any parties; a cyclic communication topology is adopted to complete the algorithm. Using the additive homomorphic encryption technique to encode the raw data into a cryptographic message, Kaleb et al. present their PPD EM algorithm [22] . To prevent the leakage of data privacy when an adversary is in control of multiple parties, Kaleb et al. enforce one-way communication across a ring topology to guarantee the corruption-resistant feature of the proposed algorithm. Similar to [22] , Yang et al. also utilize the additive homomorphic encryption technique to keep raw data safe [23] . The difference is that Yang et al. design a locally and globally secure summation protocol, and cryptographic messages are sent through a spanning tree communication topology.
However, the above PPD EM algorithms mentioned in [20] - [23] , even including the privacy-free distributed (PFD) EM algorithms in [24] - [27] , cannot be applied to the JPD modeling for correlated WFs because both the PPD and the PFD EM algorithms are designed for "horizontally partitioned data". In fact, WP and WPF data are "vertically partitioned" arXiv:1812.09247v2 [cs.LG] 24 Apr 2019 among correlated WFs. Take 3 parties and 100 samples of  3-dimensional random variables as an example. Data are  horizontally partitioned refers to the situation where party  A owns 30 samples of 3-dimensional data, party B owns  40 samples, and party C owns 30 samples, while data are  vertically partitioned means that each party owns 100 samples,  but each of them only has 1 dimension of the 3-dimensional data. Since building the JPD of multiple WPs and WPFs needs full multidimensional data but each WF only has its own historical WP and WPF data as 2 dimensions of the full multidimensional data, WP and WPF data are vertically partitioned among correlated WFs. To the best of our knowledge, a PPD EM algorithm to address the vertically partitioned data (VPD) has rarely been proposed in the literature.
Moreover, the PPD EM algorithms in [20] - [23] are not fully distributed. Both the preselected cyclic communication topology in [20] - [22] and the preselected spanning tree communication topology in [23] need a global perspective for preselection. In particular, selecting a cyclic topology is a Hamiltonian circuit problem and is proven to be NP-complete [24] . Meanwhile, the failure of any communication line on the preselected path will cause the whole algorithm to fail.
In this paper, we aim to solve the above two problems. The original contributions of this paper are threefold:
1) A PPD EM algorithm for vertically partitioned data is proposed. It consists of two original algorithms: a PPD summation algorithm for the E-step and a PPD inner product algorithm for the M-step. 2) The proposed PPD EM algorithm only needs neighboring communication with no preselected path; thus, it is fully distributed. Meanwhile, it is robust to communication line failures. 3) Based on the proposed PPD EM algorithm and GMM, we have built the JPD of multiple WPs and WPFs for correlated WFs in a distributed manner with strict data privacy protection. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the keys to the realization of the PPD EM algorithm are demonstrated. The PPD summation algorithm is proposed in Section III, and the PPD inner product algorithm is developed in Section IV. In Section V, the PPD EM algorithm for building the JPD of multiple WPs and WPFs is proposed. Case studies are presented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. ESSENCE OF THE EM ALGORITHM FOR VPD
In this section, the centralized EM algorithm for GMM is introduced first. Then, the essence of the EM algorithm for the VPD is demonstrated.
A. The centralized EM algorithm for GMM
For M spatially correlated WFs, their WP and WPF constitute a 2M-dimensional random variable X ∈ R 2M , which is defined as X = [x p1 , ..., x pM , x f 1 , ..., x f M ]. Elements x pm and x f m in X represent the WP and the WPF of the m-th WF, respectively. As a convex combination of J multivariate Gaussian distributions with its weighted coefficient w j ∈ R, mean vector µ j ∈ R 2M and covariance Σ j ∈ R 2M ×2M , the GMM-based joint PDF of X is given in (1):
where N (·) is a 2M-dimensional Gaussian distribution and θ = {w j , µ j , Σ j |j = 1, 2, ..., J} is the parameter set of the GMM-based joint PDF. Training set S ∈ R N ×2M consists of N historical observations of X. The n-th observation is described as ς n = [s n,1 , ..., s n,2M ], where s n,m is the n-th WP observation of the m-th WF, while s n,M +m is its n-th WPF observation. The closed-form expression of the centralized EM algorithm consists of the expectation step (E-step) and maximization step (M-step). For a detailed proof and derivation, refer to [17] . For the k-th iteration, the centralized E-step is given in (2) , and the centralized M-step in (3):
where T represents the transpose of a vector or matrix. After convergence, the estimation of θ is achieved, and the GMMbased joint PDF is established. Since the calculation processes are the same for every Gaussian component in every iteration, we will omit the subscripts k and j in later derivations when it does not cause ambiguity.
B. The essence of the E-step for VPD
The E-step aims to calculate the statistics Q n in (2) by the parameter θ updated from the last iteration. The main calculation is to compute N (·) in (4). However, the part that actually involves ς n only exists in the exponential term of (4), as given in (5), where δ m,i ∈ R represents the element of Σ −1 in the m-th row and i-th column, and the m-th or i-th element of µ is represented by µ m , µ i ∈ R.
Equation (5) shows that, for VPD, the E-step can be divided into two summations among every WF. One is given in (6) , and the other is in (7) . A unified form for (6) and (7) is given in (8) . Since θ is already updated from the last iteration, for the m-th WF, sharing δ m,i (s n,m − µ m ) or δ M +m,i (s n,M +m − µ M +m ) with others is essentially sharing its raw data s n,m or s n,M +m . Meanwhile, although sharing the sum of the above two is an alternative, since WP and WPF are very close, other WFs can still estimate the WP and WPF to some extent from the sum. Therefore, how to calculate (8) in a distributed manner under the premise of data privacy preservation is the key for realizing the E-step with VPD.
C. The essence of the M-step for VPD
The M-step aims to update θ in (3) by the Q n calculated from the E-step. Since Q n is already obtained by all WFs as public knowledge, every WF can directly compute (3a) to update ω. The calculations that actually involve ς n exist in (3b) and (3c).
The details of (3b) are in (9) , where the m-th element of µ is given in (10) . Due to the VPD, the m-th WF can compute µ m and µ M +m in (10) by itself. Because no WF can deduce N observations from the result of (10), each WF can share its µ m and µ M +m with other WFs since no data privacy is sacrificed.
For further investigation of (3c), the diagonal and nondiagonal elements of Σ are provided in (12) and (13), respectively. Due to the VPD, the m-th WF can only compute σ m,m and σ M +m,M +m in (12) . However, the same as µ m in (10), neither σ m,m nor σ M +m,M +m contains private information because no WF can deduce the N observations from them. Thus, each WF can share them with others.
However, the situation is completely different when calculating σ m,i in (13) because historical observations of the m-th WF and the i-th WF are both needed to compute an inner product of vectors z m ∈ R N and z i ∈ R N in (14) . Since c n , µ m and µ i are all public knowledge after the calculation of (2) and (3b), sharing (s n,m − µ m ) or (s n,i − µ i ) is essentially sharing s n,m or s n,i , which reveals privacy. Therefore, how to calculate (14) for any two WFs in a distributed manner under the premise of data privacy preservation is the key for realizing the M-step with VPD.
III. THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED
SUMMATION ALGORITHM In this section, the average consensus algorithm is first briefly introduced. Then, a PPD summation algorithm is proposed based on the average consensus algorithm and the additive homomorphic encryption technique to calculate (8) in a fully distributed manner considering privacy protection.
A. The Average Consensus Algorithm
To calculate (8) in a fully distributed manner, the average consensus algorithm is a common approach [36] . Some definitions are presented before the demonstration. The communication topology of M spatially correlated WFs is represented by a graph G = (ν, ξ), where ν denotes the set of nodes ν = {ν 1 , ν 2 , ..., ν M } and ξ denotes the set of edges ξ ⊆ ν × ν. Once the distance between two nodes is less than a preset distance threshold η, the two nodes are connected. The neighbors of node m are denoted by (17), where |N m | and |N i | denote the degrees of nodes m and i. A is a symmetric matrix, and A1 = 1,
The discrete form of the average consensus algorithm is presented in (20) . After convergence, the average value of (8) is achieved by every WF in a distributed manner. From a local perspective, each WF only needs to collect α m,i Y n,i from its neighbors to calculate a local summation in (18) during each iteration. However, in the first iteration, Y 0 n,m = y n,m of each WF is revealed to its neighbors. Thus, the average consensus algorithm is not privacy preserving.
B. The PPD Summation Algorithm
To achieve the local summation in (18) under the premise of protecting privacy, the Paillier cryptosystem, as an additive homomorphic encryption technique, is a feasible choice and is favored by many researchers for the analysis of social networks [23] or the Internet [30] . It is also adopted in this paper. Let pt ∈ Z denote a plaintext, ct ∈ Z denote a ciphertext and H denote a prespecified large prime integer. The encryption process with a public key pk is in (21) , and decryption with a secret key sk is in (22) . To compute the sum of M plaintexts, the decrypter only needs the corresponding M ciphertexts for the multiplication calculation and then decrypts it, as given in (23) . The entire process strictly protects data privacy. For more details, refer to [35] . Inspired by the secure summation protocol in [23] , we utilize the Paillier cryptosystem to compute (18) to maintain data privacy, and then we develop a PPD summation algorithm based on the average consensus algorithm: for the m-th WF in the first iteration of the average consensus algorithm, its neighbors numbered from 1 to |N m | encrypt their initial value by the 1st neighbor's pk in (24) . However, the m-th WF instead encrypts a random number R 0 in (25) . Then, neighbors send their ciphertexts to the m-th WF, and the m-th WF performs the multiplication calculation in (26) and sends it to the 1st neighbor. Thereafter, the 1st neighbor decrypts ct into the summation in (27) and sends it back to the m-th WF. Finally, the m-th WF subtracts R 0 to obtain the result of (18) . For the latter iteration, because no one can deduce the initial data from the exchange, no encryption is needed. Details are available in Algorithm 1.
IV. THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED INNER PRODUCT ALGORITHM
For the inner product calculation, once the angle β m,i in (28) is obtained, by sharing the norm z m ∈ R and z i ∈ R, which will not reveal any raw data, the inner product can be directly calculated. Therefore, the problem becomes how to approximate the angle between two vectors under the premise of data privacy preservation.
In an N-dimensional space, the probability of finding a random hyperplane separating two vectors z m and z i is proportional to the angle β m,i [41] . For calculating the probability, a publicly known random vector set Γ ∈ R N ×L is first defined, where each column is a random vector γ l ∈ R N . Then, the probability is given in (29) , which is essentially the Hamming distance calculation between two binary hash codes [42] . For a further demonstration, the binary hash function h : R N → R L , as given in (30) , is defined, where the sign function can encode an L-dimensional real vector into an L-dimensional binary vector according to the sign of each element in the real vector, e.g., if L = 4 , a = [−1, 3, 2, −5] T , then sign(a) = [0, 1, 1, 0] T . Thus, h (z m ) actually represents the sign information of the multiplication results between z m and ∀γ l ∈ Γ. Once h (z m ) and h (z i ) are obtained, (29) can easily be computed by counting the number of different sign pairs. Note that the counting process is essentially calculating the Hamming distance between h (z m ) and h (z i ) [42] , as represented by H am [h (z m ) , h (z i )]. Therefore, based on the binary hash function and Hamming distance, the angle β m,i can be calculated by (31) . For error analysis, please refer to [42] . z m , z i = z m z i cos β m,i
Our goal is not only to calculate the inner product of two vectors under the premise of protecting privacy but also to obtain all the inner products between any two WFs through a locally distributed manner. For computing all the inner product values, the set { z m , h (z m ) |m = 1, ..., 2M } is required. Thus, based on the binary hash function and the average consensus algorithm, the PPD inner product algorithm is proposed in Algorithm 2. Since the two difficulties mentioned in Section II are solved by the proposed PPD summation and inner product algorithm, the PPD EM algorithm for building the GMM-based JPD of multiple spatially correlated WFs is eventually developed. The details of the proposed PPD EM algorithm are provided in Algorithm 3, where the PPD E-step is developed by the proposed PPD summation algorithm, and the PPD M-step is developed by the proposed PPD inner product algorithm. The advantages of the proposed PPD EM algorithm are as follows:
Strict privacy preserving. For the summation calculation in the PPD E-step, the Paillier cryptosystem is used to protect the raw data; for the inner product calculation in the PPD Mstep, the binary hash function is used to prevent data privacy disclosure. The two techniques that we utilized can strictly protect privacy because no WF can deduce any raw data information from the calculation process.
Fully distributed. As we introduce the average consensus algorithm into the PPD E-step and M-step, each WF only needs to communicate with its neighbors. Thus, we avoid the assumption made in [20] , [30] , [31] that any two nodes are connected, and we improve the scalability of the proposed algorithm. Meanwhile, no preselected path for communication is required as in [20] - [23] . Thus, the proposed algorithm is fully distributed.
Robust. As the communication between neighbors may fail, robustness to communication failure is necessary. Since the proposed PPD EM algorithm is developed based on the average consensus algorithm, as long as the communication network topology is still connected, the communication failure basically will not affect the final modeling results due to the consensus feature. 
VI. CASE STUDY
The historical data of WP and WPF are from the eastern wind integration data set published by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) [43] , where we choose 9 WFs in Maryland, numbered as 4401, 5405, 6211, 6359, 6526, 6812, 6931, 7187, and 7460. Each WF possesses 20 days of hourly WP and WPF data. Thus, M = 9 and N = 480. We aim to build the JPD of the WP and WPF of the 9 spatially correlated WFs, which is a typical data vertical partitioning problem. Since the privacy-preserving feature of the proposed algorithms has already been discussed in the previous sections, this section mainly aims to verify the correctness and robust-ness of the proposed algorithm by inspecting the modeling result of JPD.
A. Correctness of the PPD Summation Algorithm
First, we use the WP data of 9 WFs at 2004/1/1-01:00 as input, and we use the proposed algorithm to estimate the summation of the 9 data points. Since we do not know which η is appropriate, we gradually increase η from 1 km to 4 km. Several communication topologies under given η are provided in Fig. 1(a) for a better understanding, and the estimation results for all WFs under different η are shown in Fig. 1(b ). Fig. 1(a) , once the threshold reaches 2.5 km, the connectivity of the network topology is achieved, and the consensus of estimation is achieved by all WFs in Fig. 1(b) . Therefore, to save the construction cost of communication lines, we set η as 2.5 km. In fact, Fig. 1(b) already shows the correctness of the proposed PPD summation algorithm because each WF reaches consensus and obtains the real summation result.
B. Correctness of the PPD Inner Product Algorithm
Since the 20-day historical WP data of one WF can be regarded as its private vector, to verify the correctness of the proposed PPD inner product algorithm, we calculate the inner products between every two WFs' private vectors by the algorithm. Because our algorithm enables every WF to obtain the inner products, we define the inner products between the m-th vector and the i-th vector calculated by the g-th WF as τ m,i,g , while the true inner product as τ true m,i . Then, the indicator that we applied for verification is the average relative error R E as defined in (32) .
Meanwhile, to choose an appropriate length L of the binary hash code, we gradually increase L from 2 5 to 2 17 . The average relative errors of the proposed algorithm under different values of L are illustrated in Fig. 2 , and the length of the binary hash code is also shown. It can be observed that the error decreases significantly as L increases, but it nearly stabilizes when L reaches 2 11 . Since more communication traffic will be required with a larger L, we finally choose L as 2 11 bit = 0.25 kb.Furthermore, the average relative error is 3.5×10 −3 when L = 2 11 , which proves the correctness of the proposed algorithm. 
C. Verification of the PPD EM Algorithm
We first use the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to set the number of Gaussian components J, where J with the lowest BIC is preferred. For more details, please refer to [44] .
The BIC values of different J with 20 days of historical WP and WPF data of 9 WFs are provided in Table I . According to the result, we set J as 5.
Thereafter, we build the JPD of the WP of 9 spatially correlated WFs using the proposed PPD EM algorithm. The JPD constructed by the centralized EM algorithm is also given as the benchmark. Since the 18-dimensional JPD cannot be drawn for illustration, we derive several 1-dimensional and 2dimensional PDs from the 18-dimensional JPD based on the linear invariance property of the GMM [2] , [45] .
The 1-dimensional probability distribution function (PDF) and the 1-dimensional cumulative distribution function (CDF) are shown in Fig. 3 . Due to space limitations, only the first two dimensions in the 18-dimensional JPD are provided. In Fig. 3 , the empirical PDs are obtained from the corresponding original historical data, the benchmarks are built by the centralized EM algorithm, and the PDs of each WF are constructed by the proposed PPD EM algorithm. It can be observed that (1) both the benchmark and the PDs of each WF match the empirical PDs very well; (2) the PD curves of each WF are coincident with each other, indicating that the consensus of probability modeling is achieved by the proposed algorithm; and (3) the PD curves of each WF are coincident with the benchmark, indicating the correctness of the proposed algorithm. Further comparisons between the benchmark and the PDs of each WF are made via relative standard error (RSE) as defined in (33) , where f (·) represents the PDF or CDF built by each WF, f 0 (·) represents the benchmark PDF or CDF, and f 0 (·) represents its mean value. The RSE results are provided Fig. 3 . The PDF and CDF of the first two dimensions in Fig. 4 . First, all the results are less than 2.4 × 10 −3 , which means that the differences between the benchmark and the PDs of each WF are extremely small. Second, compared with a benchmark, e.g., the benchmark of the 1st dimensional CDF, the RSE values of each WF are all equal to 4.8×10 −5 , showing the consensus effect of the proposed algorithm. Third, the RSE values between the CDFs are much smaller than that between the PDFs since integrating the PDF will smooth the curve and result in smaller differences. Note that CDFs are what we ultimately want for optimal decisions, e.g., calculating the quantile from the CDF. Thus, the RSE between CDFs eventually indicates the accuracy of the proposed algorithm. Between the 1st dimensional CDF and its benchmark Between the 2nd dimensional CDF and its benchmark Between the 1st dimensional PDF and its benchmark Between the 2nd dimensional PDF and its benchmark Fig. 4 . The RSE between the PD and its benchmark
We also choose the 4th and the 5th dimensions from the 18-dimensional JPD to form a 2-dimensional PDF and a CDF in Fig. 5 . Due to space limitations, only the 2-dimensional benchmark built by the centralized EM algorithm and the 2-dimensional JPD built by the 1st WF via the proposed PPD EM algorithm are illustrated. Thereafter, the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) between the JPDs built by the 1st WF and by other WFs are given in Table II to illustrate the differences between them. Since all the KLDs are less than 2.19 × 10 −15 , the JPD built by the 1st WF and the JPDs built by others are almost completely the same. Thus, using the 1st WF as a representative is reasonable and acceptable. In Fig. 5 , the 2dimensional PDF and CDF built by the 1st WF ideally match the 2-dimensional benchmarks. Therefore, the correctness of the proposed PPD EM algorithm is eventually verified. KLD (×10 −15 ) 0.33 1.11 2.06 1.01
D. The Robustness of the PPD EM Algorithm
To verify the robustness of the proposed PPD EM algorithm, we cut off communication lines and inspect the CDFs of the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th dimensions derived from the 18dimensional JPD. Since the consensus of the proposed algorithm is already verified, we still use the modeling result of the 1st WF as a representative. The CDFs built by the 1st WF after the communication failure are shown in Fig. 6 , where the benchmark represents the CDFs built by the centralized EM algorithm, Original represents the CDF built by the 1st WF when no failure occurs, and line m-i represents the CDFs built by the 1st WF when the communication between the mth WF and the i-th WF. For example, legend line 1-3 in Fig. 6 means that the communication between the 1st WF and the 3rd WF fails while other communication lines operate normally. In Fig. 6 , the CDFs built by the 1st WF under different line failures ideally coincide with the benchmark and the original CDF, which proves that the proposed PPD EM algorithm can still maintain high accuracy after communication failures. Therefore, the robustness of the proposed algorithm is verified. VII. CONCLUSION Based on additive homomorphic encryption and the average consensus algorithm, we propose a PPD summation algorithm. Based on the binary hash function and the average consensus algorithm, we present a PPD inner product algorithm. Combining the PPD summation and inner product algorithms, a PPD EM algorithm to overcome the data vertical partitioning problem is eventually developed. Compared with the centralized EM algorithm, the proposed PPD EM algorithm is fully distributed in that it only needs local communication between neighboring WFs. Meanwhile, it strictly protects the data privacy of every WF during communications. Furthermore, its robustness to communicate failure is guaranteed by the consensus feature.
